Morbid delusions of the 17th century over witchcraft spring to mind. This is not to say that the AQ threat should be ignored but that it has been grossly exaggerated. It presumes a science of society and a science of warfare. That both have evolved over time is a truism. It is the latter form of warfare that is the context of this paper, not so much that the nature of war has evolved all that much - rather that it has not. The British know and understand this because fighting irregular warfare has been part and parcel of our history for such a very long time. More prescient was the defence of the British Empire in India, which required a military commitment on the North West Frontier with Afghanistan from , a period of nearly one hundred years, until Pakistan took over the same task in 9 this and other references are merely suggested reading for those who would like to know more.
There is no comparable history of counterinsurgency anywhere in the world to match that of the British record. Insurgent goals have varied between those of nationalism, communism and religious fanaticism, or a mixture of all three. To claim, as does John Mackinlay, that there has been some lineal dimension to this evolution pays no attention to the recent Maoist insurgency in Nepal and that ongoing in India, nor that the nationalist insurgent campaigns in Northern Ireland, Spain and Corsica continue.
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Modern technology has usually been successfully applied, whether in the utilisation of dynamite or mobile phones. Conventional weapons have been adapted for the purpose of guerrilla operations. The movements have usually been able to take full advantage of the legal conundrum that surrounded activities of neither war nor peace, politically motivated yet employing criminal acts on a routine basis.
Insurgents have always relied upon neutral space, be it the mountains of Waziristan, a secure and safe haven across an international border, as in the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen PDRY as a base for the launch of attacks into Oman, and in the case of the Provisional IRA, the complex border between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. Finally, the insurgent has always assumed that he can outlast the will of the government to resist. The British Response to Insurgency If these diverse campaigns can be linked in any way it is in the nature of the response to insurgency and terrorism by British Security Forces.
All have been underpinned by a legal framework, that Common Law was to apply at all times. The identification of the nature of the insurgency has been crucial and not mistaking it for something else, is fundamental. It also requires a government propaganda campaign of its own, combining every media outlet available. Having identified the insurgent and isolated him, he has to be neutralised. This will require substantial numbers of troops and police for success, together with highly mobile forces, as with helicopters and drones, airpower and indirect fire weapons.
Yes we do! Aim This article will now attempt to estimate the extent to which British government forces went beyond their remit in this regard and examine the circumstances that might have allowed this to happen. It does not comment upon the role of the Security Services, though the current controversy over the involvement of MI5 and MI6 in waterboarding is acknowledged and there can be no doubt that this technique of interrogation amounts to an atrocity, as the Director of Amnesty International has recently made clear.
In fairness and unlike other counterinsurgencies such as those involving the French in Algeria, or at times, the USA in Vietnam, certainly the Soviet Union in Afghansitan, when atrocities have occurred, they have been swiftly dealt with under the military or civil law and the offenders punished accordingly. Misguided Senior Officers Some situations of atrocity were not so much as a consequence of a defect of character but rather a misguided sense of judgement. Of these, there are many examples, mostly involving senior British leaders in times of stress within a counterinsurgency.
Perhaps most notable or most notorious, was that which took place in South Africa between and when Kitchener was in command of British troops countering the Boer insurgency. Never minding the deaths from typhoid as a consequence of inadequate sanitation and hygiene in the field, the internment of civilians was to lead to 3, deaths in the following year after , had been interned.
That Horatio Herbert Kitchener was wholly responsible for the policy enacted cannot be in doubt. He inherited much of this from Roberts, though the tenets of counter-guerrilla warfare during the 19th century as espoused by Callwell were clearly also in play. Memorandum Number 29, dated 21 December spelt out just how the war was to be conducted. It took two humanitarian investigations, initially by Emily Hobhouse and then Dame Millicent Fawcett, to bring matters to public attention.
He had served with the Royal Irish Regiment RIR for 15 years and relieved of his command in the opening weeks of the First World War for having blatantly disobeyed orders, attempting in effect to take on the entire German Army single handed. He was sent to Portobello Barracks in Dublin so as to pose no further risk to the war effort. Perchance, his new posting coincided with the Easter Rising of Colthurst was eventually convicted of murder and pleaded criminal insanity, serving his sentence until his release in in Broadmoor prison.
Massacre out of Duty There have been other episodes of misjudgement by leaders. To his dying day, Dyer was convinced that he had no choice but to order his Gurkha soldiers to open fire on the crowd in the Jalianwallahbagh, the local town square in Amritsar, where an entirely peaceful, though illegal, demonstration was in progress. Compare Products. You have reached the maximum number of selection. You can select only upto 4 items to compare. View Order.
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We will let you know when in stock. Thank you for your interest You will be notified when this product will be in stock. I agree to the. Terms and Conditions. How It Works? IMEI Number. Exchange Discount Summary Exchange Discount -Rs. Final Price Rs. Apply Exchange. Agarwal A and A. Other Specifications. The Maoist Insurgency has been born out of long periods of social discontent, economic hardships and state apathy towards the neglected masses. Anti-Maoist operations have to be based on a strong political will, aggressive anti-guerrilla tactics and economic and social development of affected areas to win back the confidence of the people.
A common. In the modern era they continue with the operations of insurgent, revolutionary and terrorist groups. The upper end is composed of a fully integrated political-military strategy, comprising both large and small units, engaging in constantly shifting mobile warfare, both on the low-end "guerrilla" scale, and that of large, mobile formations with modern arms. In between are a large variety of situations — from the wars waged against Israel by Palestinian irregulars in the contemporary era, to Spanish and Portuguese irregulars operating with the conventional units of British General Wellington, during the Peninsular War against Napoleon.
Modern insurgencies and other types of warfare may include guerrilla warfare as part of an integrated process, complete with sophisticated doctrine , organization, specialist skills and propaganda capabilities. Guerrillas can operate as small, scattered bands of raiders, but they can also work side by side with regular forces, or combine for far ranging mobile operations in squad , platoon or battalion sizes, or even form conventional units.
Based on their level of sophistication and organization, they can shift between all these modes as the situation demands. Successful guerrilla warfare is flexible, not static. In Phase One, the guerrillas earn population's support by distributing propaganda and attacking the organs of government.
In Phase Two, escalating attacks are launched against the government's military forces and vital institutions. In Phase Three, conventional warfare and fighting are used to seize cities, overthrow the government, and assume control of the country. Mao's doctrine anticipated that circumstances may require shifting between phases in either directions and that the phases may not be uniform and evenly paced throughout the countryside. Some authors have stressed this interchangeability of phases inherent in this model and guerrilla warfare more generally, especially as applied by the North Vietnamese guerrilla.
The classical Maoist model requires a strong, unified guerrilla group and a clear objective. However, some contemporary guerrilla warfare may not follow this template at all, and might encompass vicious ethnic strife, religious fervor, and numerous small, 'freelance' groups operating independently with little overarching structure. These patterns do not fit easily into neat phase-driven categories, or formal three-echelon structures Main Force regulars, Regional fighters, part-time Guerrillas as in the People's Wars of Asia.
Some jihadist guerrilla attacks for example, may be driven by a generalized desire to restore a reputed golden age of earlier times, with little attempt to establish a specific alternative political regime in a specific place. Ethnic attacks likewise may remain at the level of bombings, assassinations, or genocidal raids as a matter of avenging some perceived slight or insult, rather than a final shift to conventional warfare as in the Maoist formulation.
Environmental conditions such as increasing urbanization, and the easy access to information and media attention also complicate the contemporary scene. Guerrillas need not conform to the classic rural fighter helped by cross-border sanctuaries in a confined nation or region, as in Vietnam but now include vast networks of peoples bound by religion and ethnicity stretched across the globe.
Guerrilla warfare is distinguished from the small unit tactics used in screening or reconnaissance operations typical of conventional forces. It is also different from the activities of pirates or robbers. Such criminal groups may use guerrilla-like tactics, but their primary purpose is immediate material gain, and not a political objective.
Guerrilla tactics are based on intelligence , ambush , deception , sabotage , and espionage , undermining an authority through long, low-intensity confrontation. It can be quite successful against an unpopular foreign or local regime, as demonstrated by the Cuban Revolution , Afghanistan War and Vietnam War. A guerrilla army may increase the cost of maintaining an occupation or a colonial presence above what the foreign power may wish to bear.
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Against a local regime, the guerrilla fighters may make governance impossible with terror strikes and sabotage, and even combination of forces to depose their local enemies in conventional battle. These tactics are useful in demoralizing an enemy, while raising the morale of the guerrillas.
In many cases, guerrilla tactics allow a small force to hold off a much larger and better equipped enemy for a long time, as in Russia's Second Chechen War and the Second Seminole War fought in the swamps of Florida United States of America. Guerrilla tactics and strategy are summarized below and are discussed extensively in standard reference works such as Mao's "On Guerrilla Warfare. Guerrilla operations typically include a variety of strong surprise attacks on transportation routes, individual groups of police or military, installations and structures, economic enterprises, and targeted civilians.
Attacking in small groups, using camouflage and often captured weapons of that enemy, the guerrilla force can constantly keep pressure on its foes and diminish its numbers, while still allowing escape with relatively few casualties. The intention of such attacks is not only military but political, aiming to demoralize target populations or governments, or goading an overreaction that forces the population to take sides for or against the guerrillas. Examples range from the chopping off of limbs in various internal African rebellions, to the suicide attacks in Israel and Sri Lanka , to sophisticated manoeuvres by Viet Cong and NVA forces against military bases and formations.
Whatever the particular tactic used, the guerrilla primarily lives to fight another day, and to expand or preserve his forces and political support, not capture or holding specific blocks of territory as a conventional force would. Ambushes on key transportation routes are a hallmark of guerrilla operations, causing both economic and political disruption.
The Third Dimension: Air Power in Combating the Maoist Insurgency - A K Agarwal - Google книги
Careful planning is required for operations, indicated here by VC preparation of the withdrawal route. In this case the Viet Cong assault was broken up by American aircraft and firepower. However, the VC did destroy several vehicles and the bulk of the main VC force escaped.
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As in most of the Vietnam War, American forces would eventually leave the area, but the insurgents would regroup and return afterwards. This time dimension is also integral to guerrilla tactics.
Guerrilla warfare resembles rebellion, yet it is a different concept. Guerrilla organization ranges from small, local rebel groups of a few dozen guerrillas, to thousands of fighters, deploying from cells to regiments. In most cases, the leaders have clear political aims for the warfare they wage. Typically, the organization has political and military wings, to allow the political leaders "plausible denial" for military attacks.
For successful operations, surprise must be achieved by the guerrillas. If the operation has been betrayed or compromised it is usually called off immediately. Intelligence is also extremely important, and detailed knowledge of the target's dispositions, weaponry and morale is gathered before any attack. Intelligence can be harvested in several ways.
Collaborators and sympathizers will usually provide a steady flow of useful information. If working clandestinely, the guerrilla operative may disguise his membership in the insurgent operation, and use deception to ferret out needed data. Employment or enrollment as a student may be undertaken near the target zone, community organizations may be infiltrated, and even romantic relationships struck up as part of intelligence gathering.
Modern computer access via the World Wide Web makes harvesting and collation of such data relatively easy. Operatives will "case" or analyze a location or potential target in depth- cataloguing routes of entry and exit, building structures, the location of phones and communication lines, presence of security personnel and a myriad of other factors.
Finally intelligence is concerned with political factors- such as the occurrence of an election or the impact of the potential operation on civilian and enemy morale. Why does the guerrilla fighter fight? We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the people against their oppressors, and that he fights in order to change the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and misery.
Relationships with civilian populations are influenced by whether the guerrillas operate among a hostile or friendly population. A friendly population is of immense importance to guerrilla fighters, providing shelter, supplies, financing, intelligence and recruits. The "base of the people" is thus the key lifeline of the guerrilla movement. In the early stages of the Vietnam War, American officials "discovered that several thousand supposedly government-controlled 'fortified hamlets' were in fact controlled by Viet Cong guerrillas, who 'often used them for supply and rest havens'.
Guerrillas and revolutionary groups can still operate using the protection of a friendly regime, drawing supplies, weapons, intelligence, local security and diplomatic cover. An apathetic or hostile population makes life difficult for guerrilleros and strenuous attempts are usually made to gain their support. These may involve not only persuasion, but a calculated policy of intimidation.
Guerrilla forces may characterize a variety of operations as a liberation struggle, but this may or may not result in sufficient support from affected civilians. Other factors, including ethnic and religious hatreds, can make a simple national liberation claim untenable. Whatever the exact mix of persuasion or coercion used by guerrillas, relationships with civil populations are one of the most important factors in their success or failure.
In some cases, the use of terrorism can be an aspect of guerrilla warfare.